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Challenging Employment Tribunal Fees: R (Unison) v Lord 
Chancellor and another (No.2)  
 
 
In R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor and another (No.2)
1
 the High Court UHMHFWHG8QLVRQ¶V
second application for judicial review of the policy of charging claimants to the Employment 
Tribunal (³ET´) and the Employment Appeal Tribunal (³EAT´).2 The policy, which was 
introduced across Great Britain by the coalition government in July 2013, removed the free 
access that has been in place since the National Industrial Relations Court was established by 
the Industrial Relations Act 1971. Had the court decided to strike it down, the judgment 
would have been effective in Scotland as well as in England and Wales. However, further 
devolution may lead to some interesting developments which are discussed at the end of this 





The Fees Order and the Added Tribunals (Employment Tribunals and Employment Appeal 
Tribunal) Order 2013
3
 now determines that claims in the ET and appeals to the EAT can only 
be started and continued upon payment of fees
4
 unless an individual qualifies for a full or 
partial waiver known as a remission.
5
 Claims are divided into two types, each with two 
separate fees: Type A claims, which include unlawful deductions from wages and breach of 
contract, attract an issue fee of £160 and a hearing fee of £230; and Type B claims, which 
include unfair dismissal and discrimination, attract fees of £250 and £950. Different rates are 
applicable in claims involving multiple claimants. Appellants to the EAT are charged a 
lodgement fee of £400 and a hearing fee of £1200. 
                                                            
1
 [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin), KHQFHIRUWK³58QLVRQ1R´. 
2
 Introduced by the Employment Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 
2013, SI 2013/1893. 
3
 SI 2013/1892. 
4
 Art 3. 
5
 In accordance with Art 17 and Sch 3 of the Fees Order. 
At a previous judicial review application
6
 Unison ran a number of arguments to 
challenge the legality of the regime. Although unsuccessful, not all of these arguments were 
completely rejected by the High Court with two (outlined below) found to lack the robust 
evidence required to justify overturning the policy. As the application had been brought prior 
to the publication of official statistics showing the decline in the number of ET claims, the 
court found that it was too early to say whether the fees would have the unlawful effects 
claimed by Unison, holding WKDW³>L@t seems to us more satisfactory to wait and see and hold 
the Lord Chancellor to account should his optimism as to the fairness of this regime prove 
unfounded.´7 8QLVRQ¶Vappeal against this decision was subsequently stayed and permission 
was granted to bring a second application following the publication of official statistics. 
 
 
B. THE APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
In the fresh application Unison, with the Equality and Human Rights Commission as 
intervener, challenged the fees regime on two main grounds. Firstly, that it has had a negative 
effect on the access to justice of certain groups of claimants in violation of the EU principle 
of effectiveness, making it virtually impossible, or excessively difficult, for a significant 
number of potential claimants to afford to exercise rights conferred by EU law, thus making 
such rights illusory. Secondly, that the regime indirectly discriminates against women, who 
are more likely than other groups of workers to be on low incomes. The Lord Chancellor¶V
failure to establish that such disadvantage is justified renders it unlawful under EU law, the 
ECHR,
8
 and section 19 of the Equality Act 2010.  
In evidence Unison relied on statistical information which showed that from October 
to December 2013, following the introduction of fees, 79% fewer claims were accepted by 
the ET compared with the same quarter in the previous year. For equal pay claims the figure 
was 83% and for sex discrimination it was 77%.
9
 The statistics for January to March 2014, 
which recorded a reduction of 81%, showed that the earlier statistics were not aberrant. 
                                                            
6
 R (Unison) v The Lord Chancellor and another [2014] EWHC 218 (Admin), heard by the 
High Court on 7 Feb 2014. 
7
 Ibid, para 89. 
8
 Art 6 read with Art 14. 
9
 The Tribunals Statistics Quarterly for October to December 2013, published on 13 March 
2014. 
The Lord Chancellor countered that the claims were still premature and that the 
generalised nature of the statistics relied upon and an absence of any examples of specific 
individuals who had been denied access to the ET made it impossible for the court to find in 





C. THE JUDGMENT 
 
The court, comprised of Elias LJ and Foskett J with Elias LJ delivering the leading judgment, 
dismissed the application on both grounds. In considering the first ground, the court reviewed 
the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the EU concerning the principle of 
effectiveness. Relying on the decisions in Impact v Minister for Agriculture and Food
11
 and 
Alassini v Telecom Italia SPA,
12
 the court found that any justifiable restrictions to the right of 
access to the courts must satisfy the proportionality test so that the imposition of unnecessary 




8QLVRQ¶Vsubmission that the fees had contributed to the dramatic reduction in claims 
was rebutted by the Lord Chancellor who argued that other initiatives such as the ACAS 
early conciliation scheme, an increase in the qualifying period for unfair dismissal claims and 
the imposition of a lower cap on unfair dismissal compensation, had also had an impact. 
While the court agreed that these factorV³PD\KDYHSOD\HGDSDUW´EXWGLG³not begin to 
explain the whoOHRIWKLVYHU\GUDPDWLFFKDQJH´,14 8QLVRQ¶Vreliance on the statistical 
information was deemed to be inadequate: actual cases were required which would enable the 
court to review the income and expenditure of particular individuals so as to apply the 




<EXT>The figures demonstrate incontrovertibly that the fees have had a marked effect on the 
willingness of workers to bring a claim but they do not prove that any of them are unable, as 
opposed to unwilling, to do so.<EXT> 
                                                            
10
 R(Unison) No 2), para 5. 
11
 Case C-68/06 [2008] ECR I-2483. 
12
 Case C-317/08 [2010] ECR I-221. 
13
 R(Unison) No 2), para 40. 
14
 Para 57. 
15
 Para 60. 
 Turning to the allegation that the Type B fee has had a disproportionate impact on 
discrimination claimants, most of whom are women, the court held that it was not appropriate 
to argue indirect discrimination based on a self-selected sub-group (i.e. the number of women 
bringing discrimination claims as a proportion of all claimants) because if a different sub-
group were selected, the reverse could be true. The statistics on unfair dismissal cases, for 
example, demonstrated an adverse impact on men.
16
 The central question was not whether 
any fee was justified but whether the different fee rates for Types A and B claims were 
justified. Accordingly, the rationale for the different rates, which was that the more complex 
Type B cases required a higher allocation of court resources, was legitimate.
17
 
In response to Unison¶VVXEPLVVLRQWKDWFRVW-saving was the sole or principal aim of 
the fees regime, the court found that the government had actually identified three objectives: 
to transfer one-third of the annual running costs to users; to make tribunals more efficient and 
effective not least by removing unmeritorious claims; and to encourage alternative methods 
of employment dispute resolution other than litigation.
18
 The court found each of these 
objectives to be legitimate. If viewed in its wider context, including the possibility of 
remission for those on low incomes and the recoverability of the costs for successful claims, 
any discrimination arising was found to be justified and proportionate. 





Unison has announced its intention to appeal.
19
 In keeping with the judgment, such an appeal 
will require evidence relating to specific individuals who were prevented from pursuing 
viable claims on affordability grounds. This might be easier said than done. The dramatic 
decline in claims is likely to be reflected in a fall in the number of individuals seeking advice 
and support through the usual channels, thus making it difficult to identify a pool of potential 
claimants. Of course, there will be some who found out about the imposition of fees only on 
seeking advice and who were refused remission. However, to require such individuals to 
                                                            
16
 Para 71. 
17
 Para 69. 
18
 Para 83. 
19
 See http://www.unison.org.uk/unison-to-appeal-high-court-decision-over-tribunal-fees. 
participate in litigation which is not directly concerned with resolving their personal dispute 
is a lot to ask. Even where willing individuals are forthcoming, the standard against which 




<EXT>The question many potential claimants have to ask themselves is how to prioritise 
their spending: what priority should they give to paying the fees in a possible legal claim as 
against many competing and pressing demands on their finances? And at what point can the 
court say that there is in substance no choice at all?<EXT> 
 
Such individuals will have to be outside of the eligibility requirements for remission, for 
which qualification depends on receipt of a means-tested benefit, and yet still be able to 
demonstrate that the fees are unaffordable. ,WLVQRWXQFRPPRQIRUDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VILQDQFHVWR
be in a state of flux following an employment dispute. This may be as a result of the dispute 
itself. The transition to a new job, perhaps requiring an application for in-work benefits, can 
make it difficult to establish a financial snapshot on which to base a rational decision about 
whether to lodge an ET claim, never mind one which is capable of satisfying the conditions 
set out by the High Court. 
The financial outlay is only one of a much wider range of costs incurred by 
individuals caught up in employment disputes. Other human costs include the effects on the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VKHDOWKDQGZHOOEHLQJDQGWKDWRIKLVor her family.21 How much account the court 
will take of relevant life circumstances is unclear yet such backstories may be critical in 
influencing decision-making for those who find themselves in financial straits, particularly in 
the current economic climate.
22
  
Any assessment of individual decision-making, therefore, requires consideration of 
the bigger picture in which wider contextual factors combine to make the fees the last in a 
long line of barriers to justice. In its submission Unison outlined a range of such factors 
which, even in the pre-fees era, militated against claimants
23
 including the lack of affordable 
legal representation and feelings of intimidation at the prospect of self-representation; the low 
                                                            
20
 R(Unison) No 2), para 61. 
21
 See N Busby and M McDermont³:RUNHUVPDUJLQDOLVHGYoices and the employment 
tribunal system: some preliminary fLQGLQJV´ (2012) 41 Industrial Law Journal 166. 
22
 For examples of individual stories see the case studies from WKHRQJRLQJSURMHFW³Citizens 




 R(Unison) No 2), para 47. 
rates or absence of compensation in some claims; and the difficulties experienced by many 
successful claimants in enforcing a money judgment.
24
 When placed in this context, spending 
£390 to chase a similar amount in unpaid wages is probably not a risk worth taking. 
However, if a claimant in this position were found to have access to £390, could it still be 
asserted that the fee had made access to justice ³H[FHVVLYHO\GLIILFXOW´? 
Recognition of the near impossible task that the High Court has set for Unison brings 
us back to the ET statistics which, on a closer reading of the judgment, actually appear to 
have been very persuasive in convincing the court that fees have made it excessively difficult 
for many claimants to proceed. In Elias LJ µVVWDWHPHQWWKDWWKHVWDWLVWLFV³«demonstrate 
incontrovertibly that the fees have had a marked effect on the willingness of workers to bring 
a FODLP´,25 it is the XVHRIWKHWHUP³ZLOOLQJQHVV´UDWKHUWKDQ³DELOLW\´ that introduces the 
margin of doubt exploited in the judgment. Perhaps Lord Foskett¶VZRUds provide a stronger 
HQGRUVHPHQWRI8QLVRQ¶VDSSURDFK:26 
 
<EXT>The effect of the new regime has EHHQGUDPDWLF«VRGUDPDWLFWKDWWKHLQWXLWLYH
response is that many workers with legitimate matters to raise before an ET must now be 
deterred from doing so because of the fees that will be demanded of them before any such 
claim can be advanced.<EXT>  
 
It is unfortunate that the court felt unable to make the inference required to find the statistics 
capable of demonstrating that the fees represent a substantial and insurmountable barrier to 
justice for many workers.  
 
 
E. THE FUTURE: A NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE? 
 
The fees policy is likely to provoke much further debate and may even prove to be the 
catalyst for a divergence in approach between Scotland and England and Wales. The Scottish 
                                                            
24
 7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VRZQUHVHDUFKKDVUHYHDOHGWKDWRQO\RIVXFFHVVful claimants were 
paid in full and a further 16% were paid in part, the Department for Business, Innovation and 




 R(Unison) No 2), para 60. 
26
 Para 96. 
judicial review in which law firm Fox and Partners has petitioned the Court of Session
27
 was 
sisted pending the outcome of Unison¶s application and may now go ahead. Even without 
further litigation the fees are likely to feature in political agendas on both sides of the border 
in the lead-up to the general election. The Smith Commission Report
28
 proposed further 
devolution of the tribunal system with the transfer of the management and operation of the 
ET to the Scottish government, which has long been opposed to fees. Unless safeguards are 
put in place, any change to policy in Scotland, such as the abolition of fees, could presumably 
lead to jurisdiction shopping with employment claims which arise south of the border being 
brought before the Scottish ET. Furthermore, the Labour Party has indicated that, if elected in 
2015, it plans to reform the ET system with a review of fees likely to form a central plank of 
those reforms. Rather than the final act, the current case appears to be the latest scene in a 
long-running drama. It is hoped that those workers whose access to justice has been denied 
are not merely consigned to supporting roles.   
 
Nicole Busby  
University of Strathclyde 
 
                                                            
27
 [2013] CSOH 133. 
28
 Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament (2014), para 63. 
